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Experimental philosophy “has rudely challenged the way profes-
sional philosophers like to think of themselves”, for unlike traditional 
philosophers, who produce their theories by reasoning alone, the advo-
cates of the new movement are “convinced that [they] can shed light on 
traditional philosophical problems by going out and gathering infor-
mation about what people actually think and say.” Those were Anthony 
Appiah’s words, describing experimental philosophy for the general pub-
lic, in 2007. There is no question that experimental philosophy, or X-Phi 
as it is usually known, a movement that started at the turn of the century, 
has been a source of controversy. Some philosophers have dismissed it 
as an inconsequential fad, whose impact on real philosophical theorizing 
is spurious. For some others, on the contrary, the results brought for-
ward by X-Phi practitioners reveal how misguided the methods used by 
traditional philosophers are; how unmotivated, and unmotivating, their 
conclusions.  
The controversy that surrounds X-Phi is undeniable. It is less clear 
though, what the movement consists in, what impact the results should 
have on philosophical theories, and even whether there is a unifying 
methodological theme that all advocates and practitioners share. Some of 
the papers in the present volume question how to interpret the origins, 
the core objectives and the methods of X-Phi. Others address more spe-
cific issues, proposing new methods, providing new data or engaging 
critically with prior discussions. Collectively, they contribute to advance 
substantially the discussion in, and about, X-Phi.  
Historically, the origin of X-Phi is tied to the idea that the main fo-
cus of the movement is to test the universality and the strength of the in-
tuitions that philosophers often use in illustrating and supporting a 
philosophical claim. Experimental philosophers have often complained 
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that when traditional philosophers report intuitions and common sense 
judgments based on intuitions, they are actually reporting just their own 
intuitions, which are often not shared by a substantial portion of the 
population. This, experimental philosophers point out, is particularly pa-
tent in the work of moral philosophers who routinely disregard the 
mountain of evidence reported in the psychology literature, as Stich and 
Weinberg (2001) have pointed out. Experimental philosophers invite 
philosophers to stop theorizing from the proverbial armchair and to en-
gage in really finding out what seems natural or intuitive to others be-
yond themselves. The push to test intuitions applies not only to ethics 
but to other areas of philosophy as well. And the way in which experi-
mental philosophers typically have sought to collect their data has con-
sisted in eliciting responses to vignettes designed to present the cases and 
mental experiments that traditional philosophers tend to use. Thus, just 
to cite a few examples, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich (2004) ar-
gued that the intuitions about reference that fuelled the semantic revolu-
tion initiated by Kripke, Donnellan and others, are in fact culturally 
dependent, as, according to their findings, those intuitions are common 
among Westerners but not so among East Asians. To establish their re-
sults, they surveyed subjects in different cultures using one of the coun-
terfactual cases that Kripke himself used to illustrate what he views as a 
natural and intuitive response. Similarly Weinberg, Nichols and Stich 
(2001) questioned the solidity of the intuitions that underlie knowledge 
attributions in the Gettier cases, citing evidence of cultural dependence, 
and Knobe’s (2003) survey famously established that attributions of in-
tentionality are influenced by the perceived moral value of the conse-
quences of an action, questioning the independence of intentionality and 
moral worth that philosophers of action and ethicists regard as a princi-
ple underlying our very conceptions of intention and value, our natural 
reactions of praise and blameworthiness. 
Some of those tests have been found to be problematic, or have 
been resistant to replication [see Nagel (2012)]. Nevertheless, a substan-
tial portion of work in X-Phi has been conducted under the assumption 
of the centrality of the task of intuition testing using the survey method, 
an assumption shared also by critics of the movement. Thus, some of 
the critics have focused on specific failures of the designs [see, for in-
stance, Lam (2010)]; others have argued that the type of intuitions elicit-
ed in particular cases are of no use to the task of the theorist [Martí 
(2009); Devitt (2011)]. Others have reacted against more general aspects 
of the X-Phi stance, questioning the value of eliciting intuitions by non-
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experts, something that has generated an intense debate around the ex-
pertise defense of traditional philosophical methodology [see, among 
many others, Devitt (2012), Machery (2012) and Schwitzgebel and 
Cushman (2012)]. Others have denied the evidentiary value of intuitions 
of experts and non-experts alike [Weekes and Schroer (2013)] or the 
fundamental role that experimental philosophers allege them to have 
[Williamson (2007)]. Others have gone even further, denying that intui-
tions have any role to play in philosophical theorizing [Cappelen (2012)]. 
This has created the perception that the discussion in X-Phi, at least 
in its origins, revolves around the role of intuitions and the methods to 
elicit the appropriate ones. That perception of the origins of X-Phi and 
the conception of its main objectives is contested by JUSTIN SYTSMA in 
the paper that opens this special issue. According to Sytsma the view that 
takes the study of intuitions as the central focus corresponds to a narrow 
conception of what X-Phi is about. More broadly, Sytsma sees X-Phi as 
a reaction to the reliance by philosophers on empirical claims that go un-
tested and are thus unsupported by evidence. Sytsma observes that often 
philosophers make empirical claims, and not all of them are about what 
seems natural or intuitive to people. All that X-Phi has brought to the 
fore is the need to provide evidence, empirical evidence, for empirical 
claims. Sytsma’s argument is not just a proposal about how X-Phi should 
be viewed, it is a historical description of what X-Phi has always been, 
for according to Sytsma the broader conception of X-Phi can be traced 
to its very origins and can be detected in many of the works of experi-
mental philosophers that do not revolve around people’s intuitions. 
A question that may arise reading Sytsma’s paper is how far the 
broad conception can go in characterizing empirical research as experi-
mental philosophy. Consider for instance Michael Devitt’s causal approach 
to reference, an approach according to which causal interactions and 
neurophysiological processes account for the bestowal of a name and the 
transmission of its use. The study of those processes corresponds to the 
physicist, the chemist and the neuroscientist, and although the results are 
relevant for philosophy, it is not clear that they should count as philoso-
phy, experimental or not. The broad conception of X-Phi may lead to a 
blurring of the line between philosophy and the empirical sciences, a re-
sult that some may find objectionable, but that may be, from the point of 
view of many others, extremely welcome. 
Moving away also from the narrow conception that sees the debate 
as revolving around intuitions, JEFFREY MAYNES’ paper proposes a new 
assessment of the role of the results obtained by experimental philoso-
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phers. According to Maynes, in testing the universality of the intuitions 
philosophers often use to buttress their claims, the work of experimental 
philosophers has an essentially dialectical purpose; for it provides evi-
dence, not only about intuitions, but in general about the beliefs and as-
sumptions that can be taken to be part of a common ground on which 
there is general agreement. If philosophers support, or simply illustrate, 
their claims by pointing out how intuitive, obvious or commonsensical 
they are, it seems simply reasonable to try and find out whether a substan-
tial portion of the population shares the philosophers’ perception of the 
status of those claims. 
A rather important issue for Maynes’ stance has to do with the as-
sessment of the impact that findings of extended agreement should have 
on the defense or criticism of philosophical theses. One might argue that 
quasi-universal agreement should not entail endorsement, as many peo-
ple would agree that one of the fundamental purposes of philosophy is 
to provide a critique of our universally held conceptions. We only need 
to remind ourselves of Descartes’ methodical doubt, to give an obvious 
example. The attitude of critical reflection on what is taken for granted is 
in itself, Maynes argues, a defense of the value of experimental philosophy, 
for X-Phi provides relevant data about agreement and disagreement. 
Like Sytsma and Maynes, NICHOLAS MCGINNIS focuses on the con-
ception and purpose of experimental philosophy. Following Sytsma’s plea 
for a broad conception of X-Phi, McGinnis argues in favor of the view, 
proposed by Knobe (2016), that X-Phi falls under the umbrella of cogni-
tive science. McGinnis focuses on the consequences of that conception of 
X-Phi for semantics, and argues for a radical form of localism and individ-
ualism. On McGinnis’ view, the correct interpretation of the results put 
forward by experimental semanticists gives us evidence of the extremely 
variegated cognitive processes that underlie speakers’ intuitions about 
reference, and in general, their language use. McGinnis concludes that 
the hope for a universal theory of semantic reference is misguided, as we 
can only count on instances of reference by individual speakers in specif-
ic occasions.  
ÅSA WIKFORRS, who like McGinnis reflects on experimental seman-
tics, defends a conclusion that is perhaps not so radical, but that is also 
controversial from the point of view of traditional semantic theory: Wik-
forss views the work of experimental semanticists as providing a basis to 
support semantic pluralism. She takes issue with the criticisms leveled by 
Martí (2009) and (2012) at Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich (2004) and 
Machery, Olivola and DeBlanc (2009). Wikforss argues against Martí’s 
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claim that the results the experimentalists report do not constitute ade-
quate input for semantic theorizing, since they do not test actual usage, the 
basis on which the semanticist starts their reflection. Wikforss concludes 
that the results reported by Machery and companions [especially in Ma-
chery, Olivola and DeBlanc (2009)] do provide the requisite evidence. As a 
consequence, she argues, philosophers of language should take those re-
sults seriously and embrace a form of pluralism, endorsing the view that 
the semantic account of how proper names function in natural language has 
to accept the cohabitation of more than one explanation of how a use of a 
name connects to a referent. If Wikforss is right, philosophers ought to 
abandon the idea that semantic theory should offer a unique account of the 
relation of reference; her conclusion should lead also to a reinterpretation 
of the debate between descriptivists and anti-descriptivists, a debate that 
has dominated the philosophy of language since 1970. If the semantics of 
names is plural, the debate is moot.  
EUGEN FISCHER and PAUL E. ENGELHARDT’S paper exemplifies 
also the broad approach to X-Phi and establishes a specific connection 
with cognitive science, proposing a psychological explanation of certain 
intuition-based inferences. It often happens that in philosophical discus-
sions, some conclusions that apparently fly against common sense are 
derived by what seems to be an impeccable argument from completely 
uncontroversial premises. One of those cases is the argument from hal-
lucination, that appears to lead us to the postulation of nonphysical ob-
jects of perception. In a hallucination, a subject seems to see a physical 
object which is not there. The experience of the subject is qualitatively 
indistinguishable from that of seeing a physical object. So, in a phenom-
enal sense of ‘seeing’, ‘the subject sees an object’ is true. From there, the 
argument goes, it follows that there is a (non-physical) object that the 
subject sees, the sense-datum. According to Fischer and Engelhardt’s di-
agnosis, the argument is incorrect because the step from ‘the subject sees 
an object’ to ‘there is an object that the subject sees’ is a faulty automatic 
inference. The authors rely on the analysis of a linguistic corpus and two 
experiments to develop an explanation of this mistake as a cognitive illu-
sion. There are automatic cognitive processes that associate to the stand-
ard visual sense of the verb ‘see’ some stereotypical inferences, such as 
the existence of something in the vicinity of the subject who sees. These 
processes misfire when, in the presence of a phenomenal sense of ‘see’, 
we still draw the same inferences, such as the existence of the perceived 
object. Fischer and Engelhardt’s paper is an example of the use of em-
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pirical methods inspired in cognitive science to diagnose philosophical 
problems. 
ADRIAN A. ZIÓŁKOWSKI’S paper focuses on the experiments de-
signed to test folk intuitions about the context sensitivity of certain ex-
pressions. The typical experiments designed to test whether an 
expression is context-sensitive ask the experimental subjects to evaluate 
sentences containing that expression used in different contexts. There 
are two alternative experimental designs to do this: in a within-subject de-
sign the different contexts are presented to all subjects, while in a between-
subject design each context is presented to a different group of people. 
Ziółkowski’s paper addresses the methodological issue of the adequacy 
of these experimental designs. Ziółkowski tests, in a bigger sample, two 
of the cases discussed by Hansen and Chemla (2013), using an experi-
mental design that allows him to extract data for both a within-subject 
and a between-subject design in one single experiment. The contextual ef-
fects can be observed more readily in the within-subject design. However, 
Ziółkowski argues that there are strong reasons to prefer a between-
subject design, a design that, as it turns out, dampens the contextual ef-
fect. It would be interesting to explore further whether his conclusion 
about the preferability of between-subject designs can be extended to 
other fields of experimental philosophy. 
PAUL POENICKE and MICHAEL CROCE also tackle an issue con-
cerning the opposition of contextualist and invariantist explanations of 
semantic phenomena, but this time restricted to the case of attributions 
of knowledge by testimony. The authors want to test whether practical 
interests affect the attribution of testimonial knowledge. The accounts of 
testimony fall into two groups depending on what is required for the 
hearer to accept the testimony of a speaker: reductionism demands that 
the hearer possess non-testimonial evidence, while for non-reductionism 
the absence of defeaters against the reliability of the speaker suffices. Af-
ter a careful review of several cases that involve testimony in the litera-
ture on experiments about stakes effects for knowledge, Poenicke and 
Croce conclude that stakes effects undermine both reductionist and non-
reductionist accounts of testimony if one adopts an invariantist notion of 
knowledge, but they can be accommodated in some non-invariantist 
theories of knowledge. The authors end their paper by suggesting several 
issues to explore experimentally in the epistemology of testimony. 
The paper that closes the volume offers a sustained criticism of the 
methodology most favored by experimental philosophers: the presenta-
tion of vignettes and questionnaires followed by a quantitative analysis of 
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the results. DAVID MOSS focuses on the experimental philosophy litera-
ture on folk meta-ethics that tries to ascertain whether people’s intuitions 
support moral objectivism or moral relativism. He presents two chal-
lenges to the quantitative method: (i) the problem of comprehension: it 
is unclear whether the experimental subjects understand the questions as 
the researchers intended, and (ii) the problem of complexity: the moral 
views of the participants’ in the experiment are considerably more com-
plex than the data, consisting of responses to few and oversimplified 
questions, may reveal. He favors a qualitative interview method, in which 
the philosopher uses slightly structured interviews with subjects, more in 
line with what philosophers traditionally have done since the time of Soc-
rates. However, there is an important difference with the Socratic method: 
in the qualitative method Moss proposes, the philosopher does not en-
gage in philosophical discussion with the subject. Otherwise there would 
be a danger that the philosopher interviewer may manipulate -even if 
unwittingly- the views of the subject, or that in an interview situation a 
phenomenon of rampant accommodation of subjects trying to say the 
right thing may arise. But these problems, Moss claims, are even more 
acute in the standard quantitative method. Moss wants to collect evi-
dence about the actual metaethical views of the subject, however incom-
plete or confused, not about the views they would defend after a 
philosophical reflection on metaethical problems. Moss’ arguments, and 
the literature he relies on, present a challenge to the use of the standard 
quantitative method in metaethics. An important question is the extent 
to which those arguments can be extended to other fields of application 
of experimental philosophy. 
As the sample of papers that compose this issue of teorema show, 
experimental philosophy is a rich and mature field of research, not only 
for its wide application to enhance the comprehension of different philo-
sophical problems, but also for the level of sophistication of the reflection 
on its own methods, in the service of a more adequate justification of the 
empirical claims that are intertwined with many philosophical theories. 
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